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Punishment and Its Limits 
Debra Parkes* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The nearly three decades in which Beverley McLachlin was a 
member of the Supreme Court, including 18 as Chief Justice, witnessed a 
number of shifts in Canadian penal policy and in the reach and impact of 
criminal law. During the Harper decade (2006 to 2015) in which the 
federal Conservatives enjoyed a majority government led by Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper, criminal justice policy took a turn toward the 
punitive. The federal government tore a page out of the American 
legislative handbook and sought to “govern through crime”,1 albeit in a 
more restrained Canadian style.2 Criminologists Anthony Doob and 
Cheryl Webster have posited that pre-Harper, Canadian criminal justice 
policy was grounded in four pillars that enjoyed support across party 
lines. These pillars were that social conditions matter; that harsh 
punishments do not reduce crime; that the development of criminal 
justice policies should be informed by expert knowledge; and that 
changes in the criminal law should address real problems.3 These 
principles were cast aside, Doob and Webster argue, beginning at least in 
2006 with the passage of numerous crime bills that, to name just a few, 
created new crimes with enhanced penalties;4 proliferated mandatory 
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1 Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed 
American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
2 See, for example, Debra Parkes, “The Punishment Agenda in the Courts” (2014) 67 
S.C.L.R. 589 [hereinafter “‘The Punishment Agenda in the Courts’”]. 
3 Anthony Doob & Cheryl Webster, “The Harper Revolution in Criminal Justice Policy… 
and What Comes Next” (2015) 36(3) Policy Options 24. 
4 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (auto theft and trafficking in property obtained by 
crime), S.C. 2010, c. 14, amending Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter “Criminal 
Code”], ss. 333, 333.1 (theft of a motor vehicle), s. 353.1 (obliterating a vehicle identification 
number), ss. 355.1-355.5 (new proceeds of crime offences); An Act to amend the Criminal Code 
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minimum sentences; reduced the availability of conditional sentences 
served in the community;5 made it easier to have someone declared a 
dangerous offender (and therefore, imprisoned indefinitely);6 removed 
opportunities for early parole;7 and more.  
While this account is compelling and importantly identifies a key 
(overtly) punitive turn,8 Canadian criminal law has long been rooted in 
punishment, albeit a punitiveness that is sometimes draped in a “liberal 
veil”.9 For example, it was a previous Liberal government that enacted 
the first batch of mandatory minimum sentences for firearms offences as 
part of its gun control legislation introduced in 1995.10 During the 2000s, 
the New Democratic Party government in Manitoba was unabashedly 
“tough on crime”, regularly calling on the federal government to enact 
more punitive criminal laws, including new offences and longer 
sentences.11 Politicians of all stripes have contributed to the expansion of 
the criminal law throughout Canada’s history.12 
Whatever its history or purposes, the evidence is clear: Canadian 
criminal law does not deliver on many of its promises and its impact is 
not distributed evenly across society. The #MeToo movement has called 
attention to how underreported and pervasive sexual violence is in 
                                                                                                             
(identity theft and related misconduct), S.C. 2009, c. 28, amending Criminal Code, id., s. 56.1, ss. 
402.1-403; An Act to amend the Criminal Code (unauthorized recording of a movie), S.C. 2007, c. 
28, amending Criminal Code, s. 431.2. 
5 Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1, amending Criminal Code, id., s. 742.1. 
6 Tackling Violent Crime Act, S.C. 2008, c. 6, amending Criminal Code, id., Part XXIV,  
s. 752ff. See Jordan Thompson, “Reconsidering the Burden of Proof in Dangerous Offender Law: 
Canadian Jurisprudence, Risk Assessment and Aboriginal Offenders” (2016) 79 Sask. L. Rev. 49, 
citing an increase in the number of dangerous offender designations following the amendments and 
noting that various aspects of the new regime “have overwhelmingly contributed to the increase in 
DOs as a whole and specifically, DOs with Aboriginal identity” (at 50). 
7 Abolition of Early Parole Act, S.C. 2011, c. 11, s. 10(1), repealing s. 125(1) of the 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20. But, see Canada (Attorney General) v. 
Whaling, [2014] S.C.J. No. 20, [2014] 1 S.C.R 392 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whaling”] (declaring the 
retrospective application of this change invalid under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms). 
8 See generally, “The Punishment Agenda in the Courts”, supra, note 2, at 591-94 and 
Debra Parkes, “Women in Prison: Liberty, Equality and Thinking Outside the Bars” (2017) 12 J.L. 
& Equality 127, at 132-36.  
9 Kelly Hannah-Moffatt and Dawn Moore, “The liberal veil: revisiting Canadian penality” 
in John Pratt et al., The New Punitiveness: Trends, Theories and Perspectives (U.K.: Willan Press, 
2005) 85. 
10 Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39. 
11 Andrew Woolford and Jasmine Thomas, “Exceptionalism and Deputization under Today’s 
NDP: Neo-liberalism, the Third Way, and Crime Control in Manitoba” (2011) 26:1 C.J.L.S. 113. 
12 Jula Hughes, “Restraint and Proliferation in Criminal Law” (2010) 15(1) Rev. Const. 
Stud. 117, at 119.  
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contemporary Canada, and how the vast majority of sexual assault 
survivors do not even seek justice in the criminal system.13 The 2018 jury 
acquittal of Gerald Stanley, a white farmer in Saskatchewan, for the 
murder of Colten Boushie, a young Cree man, has prompted 
#JusticeForColten rallies and called attention, once again, to systemic 
racism in the criminal justice system.14 Indigenous People are, at once, 
over-policed, over-incarcerated, and under-protected by Canadian law. 
While crime rates have declined or remained static in recent decades, 
calls for more punitive laws resonate with the public, resulting in our 
prisons and jails being packed with people who are Indigenous, poor, 
racialized and disproportionately dealing with disabling mental health 
issues. The shocking number of missing and murdered Indigenous 
women15 has, until recently, been met with indifference and utterly 
inadequate justice system responses. At the same time, Indigenous women 
now account for an astonishing 38 per cent of women in federal prisons,16 
despite comprising less than four per cent of the general population. 
These realities are evidence of the extent to which we overuse 
criminal law to address social problems, at great human and fiscal cost. 
We persist in pursuing punishment over more productive ways of dealing 
with harm and anti-social behaviour. We ignore the social determinants 
of crime. And we have become complacent about the deep inequalities 
throughout the criminal justice system. These conditions cry out for 
fundamental reform of our criminal law.  
It is, of course, not the role of the Supreme Court (or any court) to set 
criminal justice policy; that is the role of government. However, in the 
37 years since the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was entrenched 
in Canadian law, it is unquestionably the role of judges to answer the 
                                                                                                             
13 Zosia Bielski, “How sexual assault survivors look beyond police, courts for justice” 
Globe and Mail (February 4, 2017), online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/how-sexual-
assault-survivors-look-beyond-police-courts-forjustice/article33893684/>.  
14 The killings of Helen Betty Osborne (Cree) and J.J. Harper (Oji-Cree) with impunity in 
Manitoba in the 1980s prompted the sweeping Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba. See Murray 
Sinclair and Alvin Hamilton, Commissioners, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba 
(Winnipeg: Aboriginal Justice Inquiry, 1991). The Report’s opening words, “The justice system has 
failed Manitoba’s Aboriginal people on a massive scale,” remain true today.  
15 Margo McDiarmid, “Still no way to tell how many Indigenous women and girls go 
missing in Canada each year” CBC News (December 20, 2017), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/ 
politics/indigenous-missing-women-police-data-1.4449073> (a 2014 report by the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police found 164 Indigenous women who were missing and 1,017 Indigenous women who 
had been murdered over the past 30 years, but many advocates believe the numbers to be higher). 
16 Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Correctional Investigator 2016-
2017 (June 28, 2017), at 48, online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/pdf/annrpt/annrpt20162017-
eng.pdf>. 
354 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
constitutional questions that come before them and, where appropriate, to 
find laws and government action invalid for overstepping constitutional 
bounds.17 Furthermore, in the course of interpreting criminal provisions — 
even in non-constitutional cases — courts are guided by values and 
assumptions that result in expanding or contracting the scope of criminal 
liability and punishment. One such value is the principle of restraint, codified 
in section 718.2(d) and (e) of the Criminal Code.18 Section 718.2 states, in 
part that “(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive 
sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (e) all available 
sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances 
and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be 
considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of 
Aboriginal offenders.” Beyond sentencing, the principle of restraint is rooted 
in liberal concerns about individual liberty. Appeals to restraint may also be 
grounded in a more fundamental skepticism, informed by evidence of the 
criminal justice system’s failure to deliver on its promises and the disconnect 
between its liberal assumptions (i.e., that humans are free, rational, and equal) 
and the realities of social inequality.19   
In the years since the Charter was enacted, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has been called on to determine the constitutionality of various punitive 
measures, some old and some new. This article explores the way that some 
of those constitutional questions were answered, with a focus on McLachlin 
opinions, both before and after she became Chief Justice. It examines the 
extent to which she was a force for reining in the punishment agenda, 
particularly during the latter half of her time on the Court. The paper does 
not purport to comprehensively examine Justice McLachlin’s criminal law 
decisions for evidence of restraint or proliferation of punishment. Such a 
review would no doubt reveal a mixed record. Some decisions such as 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford20 and Carter v. Canada (Attorney 
General)21 eliminated criminal liability for acts related to prostitution and 
                                                                                                             
17 See generally, Beverley McLachlin, “Charter Myths” (1999) 33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 23-36, at 
31 (identifying as one of six Charter myths “The Myth that Courts can Decline to Decide Charter 
Issues”). Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
18 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
19 See generally, Marie-Ève Sylvestre, “‘Moving Towards a Minimalist and Transformative 
Criminal Justice System’: Essay on the Reform of the Objectives and Principles of Sentencing”, report 
prepared for the Research and Statistics Division, Department of Justice Canada (August 5, 2016), 
online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/pps-opdp/pps-opdp.pdf> [hereinafter “Sylvestre, ‘Moving 
Towards’”]. 
20 [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 (S.C.C.).  
21 [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 (S.C.C.). 
(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) PUNISHMENT AND ITS LIMITS 355 
assisted suicide as these offences were found to violate the Charter. Others, 
such as notably her decision in R. v. Creighton,22 held that the Charter did 
not require a subjective standard of fault for criminal offences and that a 
broad range of crimes (such as manslaughter and criminal negligence 
causing bodily harm) only required a lower standard of objective fault. 
Creighton substantially expanded the scope of criminal liability beyond what 
had been assumed at common law.23  
While that kind of thorough review of Justice McLachlin’s impact on 
criminal law would be a welcome contribution to the literature, this paper 
has a more modest focus. It zeroes in on the opinions she wrote in 
constitutional cases about sentencing and penal laws, including two 
decisions released in her final years on the bench, R. v. Nur24 and R. v. 
Lloyd,25 striking down mandatory minimum sentences for unjustifiably 
infringing section 12 of the Charter. It also considers an earlier decision 
rendered in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),26 on the 
unconstitutionality of prisoner voting bans. The McLachlin opinions in 
these cases speak back in various ways to punitive laws and, in all of 
them, she led the Court — either by majority or unanimity — to impose 
firm limits on the state’s right to punish. She is, at times, refreshingly 
blunt in her rejection of unsupported assertions by government of the 
benefits of punitive laws. Looking back at some of her early decisions 
shows that these concerns were long-standing for Justice McLachlin, 
including when she dissented from majority decisions upholding the 
constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences.27 The paper 
concludes with a brief consideration of the guidance provided through 
this body of case law to future courts dealing with constitutional 
challenges to punitive laws and policies.   
                                                                                                             
22 [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).  
23 For critical analyses of the way these decisions expand criminal liability through 
excluding subjective factors and social context from the assessment of criminal fault, see Marie-Ève 
Sylvestre, “The Redistributive Potential of Section 7 of the Charter: Incorporating Socio-Economic 
Context in Criminal Law and in the Adjudication of Rights” (2010-2011) 42 Ottawa L. Rev. 389 
[hereinafter “Sylvestre, ‘Redistributive Potential’”] and Isabel Grant, “Developments in Substantive 
Criminal Law: the 1993-94 Term” (1995) 6 S.C.L.R. (2d) 209. 
24 [2015] S.C.J. No. 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nur”]. 
25 [2016] S.C.J. No. 13, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lloyd”]. 
26 [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé”]. 
27 See her dissents in R. v. Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter Goltz”] and R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Morrisey”] discussed infra, text accompanying notes 59 and 60. 
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II. RESTRAINING PUNISHMENT 
The everyday practice of sentencing in courtrooms across the country, 
as well as the adjudication of constitutional cases involving challenges to 
sentencing practices or particular punishments is far removed from the 
realities of incarceration and largely disconnected from the way that its 
principles and goals are achieved (or not) through the sanctions imposed. 
A classic case in point is the persistence in appealing to the principle of 
deterrence in sentencing, despite decades of research showing that 
sentence severity generally does not influence decisions to commit crime 
or not.28 Another example is the disconnect between what we know about 
the lack of oversight and accountability of imprisonment29 and numerous 
instances of lawlessness in Canadian prisons;30 and assumptions about 
prisons as safe places for rehabilitation31 and personal transformation. 
Numerous reports have documented abuses, illegality, and a lack of 
meaningful oversight of imprisonment in Canada,32 but sentencing 
generally proceeds without consideration of these facts — what 
conditions the individual will likely experience in federal or provincial 
prisons — and on the shaky assumption that rehabilitation is a realistic 
expectation in most cases.33 There is a chasm between what we know 
about punishment and what we do, in the same way as there is a deep 
disconnect between what we know about human motivation, choice, 
constraint, and the assumptions we make about fault in substantive 
criminal law.34 
                                                                                                             
28 Anthony Doob & Cheryl Webster, “Searching for Sasquatch: Deterrence of Crime 
Through Sentence Severity” in Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz, eds., Oxford Handbook of 
Sentencing and Corrections (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 173. 
29 Debra Parkes, “Imprisonment and the Rule of Law” in Janine Lespérance et al., eds., 
Canada and the Rule of Law (Ottawa: International Commission of Jurists Canada, 2017) 193. 
30 See, for example, the events surrounding the death of 19-year-old Ashley Smith in a 
federal segregation cell while correctional officers watched, a death that was later ruled a homicide 
by a coroner’s inquest jury. Chief Coroner of Ontario, Inquest Touching the Death of Ashley Smith: 
Jury Verdict and Recommendations (December 2013), online:  
<http://www.caefs.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/A.S.-Inquest-Jury-Verdict-and-Recommen 
dations1.pdf>. 
31 There are many examples of defence counsel asking for federal prison time for their 
client, on the assumption that they will have access to programs and supports. See, for example, R. v. 
Haultain, [2012] A.J. No. 1114, 2012 ABCA 318 (Alta. C.A.). 
32 See, for example, Louise Arbour, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Events 
at the Prison for Women in Kingston (Canada: Public Works and Government Services, 1996). 
33 For a thoughtful take on how prison conditions should inform sentencing decisions see 
Lisa Kerr, “Sentencing Ashley Smith: How Prison Conditions Relate to the Aims of Punishment” 
(2017) 32(2) C.J.L.S. 187-207. 
34 Sylvestre, “Moving Towards”, supra, note 19. 
(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) PUNISHMENT AND ITS LIMITS 357 
1. Mandatory Sentences 
The constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences has emerged 
as a contested site in debates over the limits of punishment and two 
recent McLachlin decisions have intervened in a significant way in those 
debates. Mandatory minimum sentences appeal in a simplistic way to 
public calls for safety and accountability for crime. However, they 
contribute to the mass incarceration of Indigenous people, do not deter 
crime, and are extremely costly in human and fiscal terms.35 In pursuit of 
their underlying purpose — to remove discretion from judges perceived 
to be overly lenient in sentencing — these sentences transfer discretion 
to the unreviewable charging decisions of prosecutors.36 Mandatory 
sentencing laws have proliferated37 in Canada over the past 25 years and 
until recently, Charter rights have not acted as a meaningful check on 
governments intent on enacting them. In the decades following the early 
Charter decision in R. v. Smith,38 declaring a mandatory seven-year 
sentence for importing a narcotic invalid on the basis that it amounted to 
                                                                                                             
35 Isabel Grant & Elizabeth Sheehy, “Cleaning Up the Mandatory Minimums Mess” Policy 
Options (May 8, 2018), online: <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2018/cleaning-up-the-
mandatory-minimums-mess/>.  
36 Debra Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle: The Charter’s Minimal Impact on Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences” (2012) 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 149, at 150-52 [hereinafter “Parkes, ‘From Smith to 
Smickle’”]. It is important to remember, however, that individual Crown attorneys are subject to 
prosecutorial guidelines that limit their discretion, including in cases involving mandatory minimum 
sentences. See, for example, Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook, Chapter 6.4 
Mandatory Minimum Penalties under the Criminal Code, online: <http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc. 
ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/tpd/p6/ch04.html#section_2>. That section states that it “will generally 
be inappropriate to either agree to a plea to a lesser offence, or to stay or withdraw a charge, when it 
is done with the intent of avoiding the imposition of an MMP, where the evidence supports the 
original charge. Also, where there are two possible charges in a prosecution and one has an MMP 
and one does not, or both have an MMP but one is higher than the other, the one with the MMP or 
the one with the highest MMP should proceed.” Federal prosecutors need the consent of the Chief 
Federal Prosecutor to agree to stay or withdraw an offence with a mandatory sentence.   
37 For a paper published in 2012, I tallied nearly 100 mandatory sentences, with the vast 
majority of those being added in the preceding 20 years: Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle”, id. I 
counted 84 mandatory minimum sentences in the Criminal Code, supra, note 4, and 14 in the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 [hereinafter “Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act”] (counting a hybrid offence as one even where there is a minimum sentence for both 
indictable and summary options; and counting a first offence minimum as one and a subsequent 
offence minimum as another). A study by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association identified 
approximately 50 mandatory minimum sentences in the Criminal Code, noting that different 
methods of counting may yield different absolute numbers while concluding that “it is beyond doubt 
that mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment are a growing trend in Canada”: Raji Mangat, 
More than We Can Afford: The Costs of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing (Vancouver: British 
Columbia Civil Liberties Association, 2014), at 9. 
38 [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.).  
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cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court went quiet, upholding 
a number of mandatory minimum sentences39 on the basis that they were 
not “grossly disproportionate” when applied to the accused and a limited 
range of hypothetical cases, meaning that they did not “shock the 
conscience of Canadians”.40 
The trajectory of the Supreme Court’s section 12 jurisprudence took a 
turn in 2015. In her opinion R. v. Nur,41 and shortly thereafter in R. v. 
Lloyd,42 the Chief Justice breathed life into the analysis that determines 
whether a measure constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, making 
section 12 a more meaningful check on the overreach and harms of 
mandatory sentences. At issue in Nur was section 95(2)(a) of the 
Criminal Code, which imposes a three-year minimum sentence for 
possession of a firearm that is loaded or kept with readily accessible 
ammunition, where the Crown proceeds by indictment. The problem with 
the mandatory sentence in Nur, as the Chief Justice stated, is that it 
“casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct.”43 Indeed, this is the 
reality for most mandatory sentences. However, more specifically, the 
offence in Nur is a hybrid one for which the Crown may proceed 
summarily or by indictment. It punishes conduct that is very dangerous 
and morally blameworthy, as well as much less serious scenarios. For 
Chief Justice McLachlin, it was important to consider the full reach of 
the sanction to determine its constitutionality. 
The Chief Justice flatly rejected the submissions of provincial 
attorneys general who argued that in reviewing a mandatory minimum 
sentence for compliance with section 12 a court should only consider its 
impact on the accused person before the Court. Her decision made it 
                                                                                                             
39 See, for example, R. v. Luxton, [1990] S.C.J. No. 87, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) 
(mandatory life sentence and mandatory 25-year parole ineligibility period for first degree murder); 
Goltz, supra, note 27 (minimum seven days in prison and $300 fine for a first offence of driving 
while prohibited); Morrisey, supra, note 27 (four-year minimum sentence for manslaughter 
committed with a firearm); R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Latimer”] (mandatory life sentence and minimum 10-year parole ineligibility period for 
second degree murder). 
40 Lloyd, supra, note 25, at para. 33. For a sample of the critical commentary on this 
deferential line of cases, see Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367; Peter Sankoff, “The Perfect Storm: Section 12, 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences and the Problem of the Unusual Case” (2013) 21:3 Constitutional 
Forum Constitutionnel 1; Benjamin Berger, “A More Lasting Comfort? The Politics of Minimum 
Sentences, the Rule of Law, and R. v. Ferguson” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 101 [hereinafter “Berger, 
‘More Lasting Comfort’”]; Parkes, “From Smith to Smickle”, supra, note 36.   
41 Nur, supra, note 24.  
42 Lloyd, supra, note 25. 
43 Nur, supra, note 24, at para. 82. 
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clear that the key “question is simply whether it is reasonably foreseeable 
that the mandatory minimum sentence will impose sentences that are 
grossly disproportionate to some peoples’ situations, resulting in a 
violation of s. 12.”44 The only limit on this analysis is that “far-fetched” 
or “remote” situations are excluded.45 She confirmed that the personal 
characteristics of people potentially caught by the mandatory minimum 
cannot be excluded from the analysis, noting that “what is reasonably 
foreseeable necessarily requires consideration of the sort of situations 
that may reasonably be expected to be caught by the mandatory 
minimum, based on experience and common sense.”46 In doing so, she 
reinvigorated the analysis from Smith that had been significantly limited 
in the intervening section 12 decisions of the top court. 
In applying the new reasonable foreseeability approach to the 
sentence at issue in Nur, the Chief Justice cited the hypothetical 
identified by the Court of Appeal, namely “a situation at the licensing 
end of the spectrum of conduct caught by section 95(1) for which a 
three-year sentence would be grossly disproportionate — where a person 
who has a valid licence for an unloaded restricted firearm at one 
residence, safely stores it with ammunition in another residence, e.g. at 
her cottage rather than her dwelling house.”47 Situations like this one that 
are essentially licensing offences have arisen in the case law and are 
clearly within the foreseeable application of the law, although it may be 
rare for the Crown to proceed by indictment in such cases. On that point, 
the Chief Justice cited Smith to reject the argument of the attorneys 
general that prosecutorial discretion could be relied on to salvage the 
constitutionality of the mandatory sentence.  
In thinking about the limits of punishment, a particularly significant 
aspect of Nur is the Chief Justice’s candid discussion of the principle of 
deterrence as it relates to sentencing severity. Considering whether the 
section 12 violation entailed by the mandatory sentence was a reasonable 
limit under section 1, she noted that “[d]oubts concerning the effectiveness 
of incarceration as a deterrent have been longstanding”,48 citing the 1987 
Sentencing Commission Report.49 She went on to cite the extensive 
                                                                                                             
44 Id., at para. 57. 
45 Id., at para. 68, citing Goltz, supra, note 27.  
46 Nur, id., at para. 74. 
47 Id., at para. 79. 
48 Id., at para. 113. 
49 Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach — Report 
of the Canadian Sentencing Commission (Ottawa: The Commission, 1987).  
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criminological literature which “suggests that mandatory minimum 
sentences do not, in fact, deter crimes”.50 As one commentator recently 
noted, “it is difficult to contain the logic of this ruling to mandatory 
minimum sentences alone.”51 Indeed, shortly after Nur, the Chief Justice 
signed onto the dissenting opinion of Gascon J. in R. v. Lacasse,52 in 
which the dissenters would have overturned a trial judge’s sentencing 
decision for impaired driving causing death because it overemphasized 
deterrence, minimized key mitigating factors, and did not individuate. 
While Nur dealt with firearms, it was a drug offence at issue in 
Lloyd.53 Section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances 
Act54 mandated a minimum sentence of one year in prison for trafficking 
or possession for the purpose of trafficking in a Schedule I drug such as 
heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, where the individual has been 
convicted of any drug offence other than simple possession within the 
previous 10 years. The Chief Justice developed and applied the more 
nuanced reasonable foreseeability analysis she introduced in Nur, 
holding that the mandatory one-year sentence caught within its net 
conduct for which the sentence would be grossly disproportionate. In 
addition to selling drugs, the definition of trafficking includes sharing or 
administering a drug, meaning that the mandatory sentence would apply 
to a person addicted to drugs who shared a small amount of drugs with a 
friend or spouse and who had a conviction for a similar offence nine 
years earlier.55 The provision applies to any amount of Schedule I drugs 
and the previous conviction need not even be for a Schedule I drug; it 
could be a conviction in relation to a small amount of marijuana, for 
example. Many street-level traffickers, who are themselves users, are 
paid in drugs and only traffic to support their addiction. The Chief Justice 
foresaw the mandatory sentence applying to an individual such as this 
who, between conviction and sentence, was able to address the addiction 
through treatment and was not deserving of a one-year jail sentence, but 
a sentencing judge would be required to make that order. She concluded 
                                                                                                             
50 Id., at para. 114. 
51 Benjamin L. Berger, “Reform of the Purposes and Principles of Sentencing: A Think Piece”, 
report prepared for the Research and Statistics Division, Department of Justice Canada (October 2016), 
online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/rpps-ropp/RSD_RR2016-eng.pdf>, at 9 [hereinafter 
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52 [2015] S.C.J. No. 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 (S.C.C.).  
53 Supra, note 25.  
54 S.C. 1996, c. 19.  
55 Lloyd, supra, note 25. 
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that such a sentence would be grossly disproportionate in the circumstances 
and would “shock the conscience of Canadians”.56 
In declaring the mandatory sentence in Lloyd invalid, the McLachlin 
majority required that Parliament either narrow the penalty’s reach to 
“catch only conduct that merits the mandatory minimum sentence” or to 
“provide for residual judicial discretion to impose a fit and constitutional 
sentence in exceptional cases.”57 Notably, the dissent in Lloyd looked to 
the Court’s previous jurisprudence on mandatory sentences and 
suggested that Parliament is traditionally entitled to deference and “not 
obliged to create exemptions to mandatory minimums as a matter of 
constitutional law.”58 It is certainly the case that Nur and Lloyd marked a 
departure from the deferential stance of the Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on mandatory sentences, but it was a welcome one that had been 
foreshadowed by a number of Justice McLachlin’s earlier opinions. 
Beginning very earlier in her tenure on the Court, McLachlin J. 
dissented in the 1991 decision in Goltz,59 where the majority upheld a 
mandatory seven-day prison sentence. She would have found it to violate 
section 12 of the Charter, taking the view that for the constitutional 
analysis to be meaningful it needed to consider reasonable hypotheticals 
that might arise. A decade later she also signed on to Arbour J.’s dissent 
in Morrisey,60 a decision acknowledging that mandatory minimums had 
the effect of inflating the sentencing floor for crimes to which they were 
attached. As in her dissent in Goltz, the dissenting opinion in Morrisey 
emphasized the need for a meaningful reasonable hypothetical analysis, 
one that considered characteristics and circumstances of accused persons 
that might reasonably arise. Finally, the Chief Justice’s unanimous 
decision for the Court in R. v. Ferguson,61 also foreshadowed the 
approach she later took on behalf of the Court in Nur. In Ferguson, the 
question before the Court was whether an individual could be exempted 
under section 24(1) of the Charter from the application of an otherwise 
valid mandatory minimum sentence if it would be unconstitutional as 
applied to that person. Chief Justice McLachlin ruled that constitutional 
exemptions were not available to remedy unconstitutional sentences. If a 
law produced unconstitutional effects as it applied to anyone, that law 
                                                                                                             
56 Id., at para. 33. 
57 Id., at para. 3. 
58 Id., at paras. 95 and 108. 
59 Supra, note 27. 
60 Supra, note 27. 
61 [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.).  
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was invalid and should be so declared. While this decision denied a 
discretionary remedy in some cases, it was a bold statement of 
Parliament’s responsibility to enact constitutional laws; the Court was 
not going to clean up Parliament’s mess or remedy its overreach. 
Benjamin Berger aptly predicted that Ferguson “may trouble the easy 
politics around minimum sentences and will at least send the right 
judicial message about the substantive demands we make of our penal 
laws”.62 
The recent decisions in Nur and Lloyd are important for the life they 
breathe into the section 12 analysis. However, the pathologies of our 
criminal justice system run much deeper than the proliferation of 
mandatory minimum sentences and the gross disproportionality standard 
for section 12 remains a high bar. In short, “a great deal of unfairness can 
take place short of gross disproportionality”.63 Therefore, it is heartening 
that concern about over-reaching punitiveness emerges in other cases 
involving the constitutionality of sentencing measures, including in R. v. 
Safarzadeh-Markhali.64 At a time of soaring pre-trial detention rates,65 
the Harper government passed the Truth in Sentencing Act66 which aimed 
to eliminate enhanced credit for pre-trial detention. The Chief Justice 
wrote the unanimous opinion in Safarzadeh-Markhali, declaring invalid 
the denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody when the person 
being sentenced was denied bail primarily because of a prior 
conviction.67 The impact of this provision was found to be 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it deprived individuals of their 
liberty in ways that have nothing to do with its legislative purpose of 
enhancing public safety and security.68  
                                                                                                             
62 Berger, “More Lasting Comfort”, supra, note 40. 
63 Benjamin L. Berger, “Constitutional Principles” [hereinafter “Berger ‘Constitutional 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), at 19. 
64 [2016] S.C.J. No. 14, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 180 (S.C.C.).  
65 Correction Services Program – Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, “Trends in the use 
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66 S.C. 2009, c. 29. 
67 Criminal Code, supra, note 4, s. 719(3.1). 
68 This decision built on the unanimous opinion of the Court penned by Karakatsanis J. in 
R. v. Summers, [2014] S.C.J. No. 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575 (S.C.C.), which was a pointed rejection of 
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2. Prisoner Disenfranchisement 
We turn now to another key McLachlin decision, this time outside the 
sentencing context. Sauvé69 dealt with the constitutionality of a prisoner 
voting ban and McLachlin C.J.C.’s majority opinion took aim at the excesses 
of punishment. She also signed on to other decisions limiting punishment 
such as the unanimous opinion in Whaling,70 in which the Supreme Court 
had little trouble finding the retroactive repeal of an early parole process to 
violate section 11(h) of the Charter; United States of America v. Burns,71 on 
the constitutional limits on extradition to face the death penalty; and two 
decisions, May and Khela, upholding the rights of prisoners to seek timely 
habeas corpus review of unlawful prison conditions.72 However, the focus of 
this section will be her decision in Sauvé and what it says about the limits of 
punishment and the role of courts in enforcing those limits. 
Sauvé was a constitutional challenge to section 51(e) of the Canada 
Elections Act,73 which disenfranchised prisoners serving a sentence of two 
years or more. Rick Sauvé, a lifer, together with a group of Indigenous 
prisoners, argued that prisoner disenfranchisement violated sections 3 and 15 
of the Charter, the right to vote and the equality guarantee respectively.  
In a 5-4 decision, the Chief Justice wrote a forceful majority opinion 
finding the law to be an unjustified infringement of the section 3 Charter 
right of all citizens to vote. In so doing, Sauvé imposed a significant limit 
on popular punitiveness in Canada.74 The decision made clear that 
prisoners — or citizen lawbreakers, to use the Court’s terminology — “do 
not hold attenuated, weaker versions of the rights enjoyed by other 
Canadians” and are “unequivocally full rights holders under the 
Charter”.75 The Charter, the majority proclaimed, “emphatically says that 
prisoners are protected citizens, and short of a constitutional amendment, 
lawmakers cannot change this”.76   
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The McLachlin majority holds in Sauvé that it is constitutionally 
unacceptable to deny prisoner voting rights for the dual purpose of 
enhancing the criminal sanction and promoting respect for the rule of 
law. This kind of expressive punishment, pursued in the absence of any 
evidence of its efficacy,77 was defended by the government as a 
reasonable limit on the right to vote under section 1. For the Chief 
Justice, those objectives barely scraped through the first stage of the 
Oakes analysis,78 while they enjoyed strong support among the 
dissenting judges who were very deferential to the government’s vague 
justifications. Chief Justice McLachlin’s opinion pushes back against the 
popular acceptance of harsh punishments, particularly where there is 
simply no evidence they are necessary or effective.  
It is worth contemplating the impact of Sauvé since it has become an 
important precedent internationally. Sauvé takes Canada in a fundamentally 
different direction from our American neighbours, where lifetime bans on 
even former prisoners ever voting have been upheld as constitutional.79 The 
Sauvé majority has been influential in decisions to reject prisoner voting 
bans on human rights grounds by the European Court of Human Rights,80 
the South African Constitutional Court,81 and the High Court of Australia,82 
among others.  
Domestically, Sauvé also set a new tone for rights litigation by prisoners 
in the Charter era. While some judges continue to meet prisoner’s rights 
claims with a posture of deference toward correctional legislation and 
decision-making,83 we have seen some important successes by prisoners in 
constitutional and human rights cases dealing with conditions of 
confinement. For example, in the recent trial decisions in Ontario84 and 
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British Columbia85 declaring unconstitutional certain aspects of the federal 
law authorizing solitary confinement, deeply entrenched and widespread 
correctional laws and policies are being subjected to close scrutiny and 
have been found wanting. Sauvé is rightly considered an important case for 
limiting the state’s power to punish.86 
III. THE FUTURE OF RESTRAINING PUNISHMENT 
The political process has utterly failed to rein in punishment. Under 
Harper, punitive laws proliferated but despite promises of the Trudeau 
government to roll back some of these excesses and to reform criminal 
law more broadly, the results so far have been disappointing. The pointed 
prompt from the Supreme Court in Nur and Lloyd to at least provide a 
safety valve from the excesses of mandatory sentences has not yet 
yielded a legislative response.87 With at least 174 Charter challenges to 
mandatory minimum sentences before Canadian courts,88 sentencing 
policy is being changed on a piecemeal and inconsistent basis.  
The Liberal government’s omnibus crime bill, C-75,89 introduced in 
March 2018, sets out to amend a number of Criminal Code provisions, 
including those dealing with bail, preliminary inquiries, and jury selection, 
but we are hearing crickets on sentencing reform (other than the proposed 
increase in the Bill of the default maximum penalty for summary conviction 
offences to two years less a day, from six months). Unfortunately, the only 
movement is a ratcheting up, rather than a ratcheting down, of sentences. 
Recently, Senator Kim Pate stepped into the legislative void,90 introducing a 
Private Member’s Bill in the Senate that would restore judicial discretion to 
depart from mandatory sentences where the circumstances warrant.91 
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Perhaps the most troubling of mandatory sentences, and one that is often 
left out of discussions aimed at abolishing them, is the mandatory life 
sentence and mandatory parole ineligibility periods for murder (25 years for 
first degree murder and between 10 to 25 years for second degree murder).92 
Under this mandatory sentencing regime, which is harsh by international 
standards,93 Canadians sentenced for murder are spending many more years 
in prison today than they did at the time capital punishment was abolished in 
1976.94 Nearly one quarter of people under federal correctional supervision 
are lifers.95 The impact of these sentencing provisions is gendered and 
racialized, as it is for other mandatory sentences. From 2005 to 2015, 
Indigenous women comprised 44 per cent of new women lifers, and this 
overrepresentation is even more pronounced than it is for Indigenous men.96  
Canada’s murder sentencing regime has become more punitive in 
recent years as Parliament has amended the Criminal Code to allow 
parole ineligibility periods to be made consecutive to one another and to 
abolish an important opportunity for early parole review, the so-called 
“faint hope clause”. The resulting sentences, including those that amount 
to de facto life without parole, raise important constitutional questions 
that are beginning to come before the courts.97 Decades have passed 
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since the Supreme Court of Canada last considered the constitutionality 
of the mandatory life sentence and parole ineligibility periods for 
murder98 and first degree murder,99 in all cases finding no Charter 
infringement. This question is ripe for reconsideration in the light of 
legislative changes that have substantially lengthened parole ineligibility 
periods, particularly given the degree to which earlier courts relied on the 
faint hope clause to uphold murder sentences as constitutional.100 
The approach Chief Justice McLachlin took to reviewing the 
constitutionality of mandatory sentences in Nur and Lloyd and prisoner 
disenfranchisement in Sauvé emphasizes the importance of looking at the 
real impact and reach of these provisions. She also signalled that 
evidence matters in justifying punitive laws. In Nur and Lloyd this meant 
questioning the “common sense” of deterrence as a principle justifying 
longer sentences and in Sauvé it meant refusing to defer to vague, 
expressive justifications for punishment. The solitary confinement 
Charter challenges are working their way toward the Supreme Court,101 
along with the many challenges to mandatory sentences. The murder 
sentencing regime is crying out for a careful examination of its impact in 
relation to its policy goals and the new constitutional standard for section 12 
articulated in Nur and Lloyd. The lengthening of parole ineligibility 
periods, the abolition of the faint hope clause, and the way the mandatory 
life sentence precludes consideration of social context and different 
levels of culpability, including Gladue factors,102 combine to produce 
compelling arguments that the regime is cruel and unusual. Clearly, we 
are going to continue to need the Supreme Court of Canada to act as a 
check on the state’s punishment agenda. In considering the cases that will 
no doubt come before them, current and future judges would do well to 
build on the legacy of Chief Justice McLachlin’s punishment cases. 
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